Copyright
This document is under copyright law; portions may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included. Any comprehensive reproduction requires prior written permission of the publisher. All images without an explicit source credit are from the files of Kiel Conference staff and may not be reproduced without written permission. Credits for the front pages images, from left to right: U.S. Navy, Kiel Conference, Bundeswehr.
Welcome Remarks
by Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause 4
by RAdm (DEU N) Jan C. Kaack 5

Conference Agenda 6

Key Note Address by Vice Admiral (RN) Clive CC Johnstone 10

Panel One
Exploration and Shipping 12

Panel Two
Sea Power in the High North 16

Panel Three
Diplomatic and Cooperative Avenues 22

Key Note Conversation 26

Conference Impressions 28

Bios 30

About 42
Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause
Director Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK)

On our maiden voyage in 2015, the Kiel Conference, figuratively speaking, steamed into the Baltic Sea. We asked probing questions about security challenges concerning the maritime focus area on Kiel’s doorstep. For the Kiel Conference 2016, the second such event held in the framework of the annual Kiel Week, we advanced into a much colder region. To borrow a popular movie title, we wanted to debate if it was “High Noon” in the High North – or rather time for a casual afternoon tea. However, our reality check has demonstrated that a bellicose approach to the Arctic is unjustified. We learned that a new gold rush to exploit Arctic seabed resources under military cover is also not on the books (save for those of some conspiracy theorists).

Yet, the global strategic framework is changing fundamentally. International relations in the High North are subject to these developments. We need an open and honest, problem-oriented debate to assess these changes and recommend suitable contributions of maritime security stakeholders to alleviate threats so that policy-makers can be prepared best for what lies ahead in this century. The future will tell whether cooperation or competition in the High North prevails. We believe that sound maritime strategy and conscious policy-makers can go a long way to provide avenues to cooperate and collaborate so that all tools of sea power and statecraft can be leveraged. The Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) will continue to contribute to global maritime security awareness by providing high quality research and analyses. To this end, we have recently established a dedicated Center for Maritime Strategy & Security. I invite you to be in touch with us!

The ISPK wishes to thank the NATO Public Diplomacy Division (Brussels), RaytheonAnschütz (Kiel) and Risk Intelligence (Vedbæk) for their support in organising this conference.
Dear Participants and Readers!

Based on last year’s promising launch the expectations were high; yet the second iteration of the Kiel Conference was even more successful than the first! The feedback we received from the participants was overwhelming indeed. To analyse general challenges to maritime security by focusing on a specific area proved itself as an ideal approach.

Even though the High North may not be in the immediate political or geo-strategic focus, the subject was perfectly suitable in order to stimulate intellectual debate and thinking outside the box. In fact it has been an exciting day filled with thought-provoking presentations and lively discussions between one hundred hand-picked international experts from academia, military, politics and industry, who shared their views, and deepened the mutual understanding of maritime security. Although the general assumption was that the Arctic is not an issue of immediate concern to most participants, the vast majority developed awareness that this may not necessarily be the case in decades to come.

Thus the Kiel Conference once more provided a thrilling forum by addressing a relevant topic at the right time and discussing amongst the right people. As a result of the combined efforts of the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University, the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters, and the German Navy’s Flotilla 1, this event has evolved to be another driver for establishing Kiel as a hub of maritime strategic thinking.
Conference Agenda

Tuesday, 21 June 2016
Venue: Hotel Maritim Bellevue, Bismarckallee 2, D-24105 Kiel

08:00 – 08:50  Registration, Welcome Coffee & Light Breakfast

09:00 – 09:10  Welcome Remarks & Conference Opening
by CAPT (DEU N) Johannes Schmidt-Thomée, Executive Director,
Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters, Kiel

Video Message Conference Co-Chairman KC16
by RAdm (DEU N) Jan C. Kaack, Director Centre of Excellence for Operations
in Confined and Shallow Waters and Commander Flotilla 1, Kiel
(from EU NAVFOR Atalanta, Gulf of Aden)

09:10 – 09:40  Key Note
by Vice Admiral (RN) Clive CC Johnstone, CB CBE,
Commander NATO Allied Maritime Command, London

09:40 – 09:45  Setting the Scene: Remarks
by Dr. Sebastian Bruns, Head of Center for Maritime Strategy & Security,
Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK)

09:45 – 11:00  Panel One
Exploration and Shipping: Common Interests?
*The High North is an area of increasing international interest, especially due to the prospects of exploiting vast natural resources. Concurrently, the receding polar ice promises the option of year-round shipping routes, thus halving the distance for transits between Asia and Europe. Exploiting these anticipated prospects creates challenges with regard to maritime security. Moreover, besides economic ambitions and commercial interests in this remote region, technical progress must be factored in as well. Panel 1 provides hands-on views on the Arctic from an ecological and economic maritime security perspective.*
Speakers: Philipp Hermes, Partner, BHM Penlaw, Hamburg Rear Admiral (DNK N) ret. Torben Ørting Jørgensen, Senior Director and Head of Global Specialised Tonnage, Maersk Broker K/S, Copenhagen

Chair: Dr. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Barents Chair in Politics, University of Tromsø-The Arctic University of Norway

11:00 – 11:30 Coffee Break & Networking

11:30 – 12:45 Panel Two

Seapower in the High North – Concurrent Approaches?
After more than two decades of post-Cold War NATO transformation directed at other areas of interest around the globe, the High North is being rediscovered by strategic thinkers and planners alike. Besides neighbouring NATO countries, states such as Russia and China are also showing a growing interest and consequently an increasing presence at the Northern flank of the Alliance. Easier access to Arctic waters unveils new strategic opportunities and challenges alike. Consequently, all tools of national power might need to be calibrated accordingly. Panel 2 traces the contemporary nature of seapower in the Arctic.

Speakers: Dr. Igor Sutyagin, Senior Research Fellow in Russian Studies, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London Dr. Lee Willet, Head of Naval Desk and Editor Jane’s Navy International at IHS Jane’s, London Dr. Sarah Kirchberger, Author of "Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications", University of Hamburg

Chair: Peter Roberts, Senior Fellow for Sea Power and Maritime Security, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London

12:45 – 14:00 Lunch Break (Buffet) & Networking
Panel Three
Cooperative and Diplomatic Avenues – A Blueprint for Maritime Security Regimes?
The High North offers a unique chance to quell emerging inter-state conflicts through legal norms, political forums, diplomatic measures, and cooperative avenues. Therefore, this region could evolve into a role-model for other maritime regions and perhaps even as a blueprint for a cooperative global maritime governance. However, this assumes that the neighbouring states and other relevant players succeed in establishing a trustworthy maritime security regime and foster the rule of international law. Nonetheless, keen economic prospects in conjunction with unilateral political interests and military power might be a tempting vision to thwart a strictly consensual approach. Panel 3 investigates the sustainability of existing political and legal frame-works regarding the Arctic.

Speakers:
Prof. Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Professor at the European University Viadrina Frankfurt/Oder
Bruce Stubbs, Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy Division OPNAV N51B at Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
Dr. Kristian Åtland, Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Kjeller, Norway

Chair:
Dr. Stephanie Babst, Head of Strategic Analysis Capability, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Brussels

15:15 – 15:45 Coffee Break & Networking

15:45 – 16:45 Keynote Conversation
The Keynote Conversation seeks to emphasise selected aspects of the discussions of Kiel Conference 2016. It provides insights on how military leaders, academic analysts, and policymakers could address maritime security challenges in the High North. It is also designed to emphasise the universal role of the maritime domain in conflict resolution and crisis management, taking a broader global view on strategic challenges of the next decade.
Panelists: 

Dr. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Barents Chair in Politics, University of Tromsø-The Arctic University of Norway (Chair, Panel 1)
Peter Roberts, Senior Fellow for Sea Power and Maritime Security, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London (Chair, Panel 2)
Dr. Stephanie Babst, Head of Strategic Analysis Capability, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Brussels (Chair, Panel 3)

Chair: 

Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause, Conference Co-Chairman KC16 and Director, Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University (ISPK)

16:45 – 17:00 
Closing Remarks
by Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause, Conference Co-Chairman KC16 and Director, Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK)

17:00 – 18:30 
Conference Reception
“The Arctic is a really harsh environment. It rewards understanding […] and cooperation, not confrontation.”

“NATO […] must be prepared to meet any challenge in an unpredictable future. We need presence and posture, we need activity that denies adventurism and we need to be credible and maintain a thing I would call escalation control.”

“I sense it’s an area […] of great realized and potential importance. […] Perhaps this is why NATO should have an interest and an awareness – if not a leading voice.”

“We need to reassure constituent Nations and to remain and retain a solid deterrence posture and become more agile. […] We’ve got to break through this idea of NATO being a fixed entity. It’s got to modernize and it’s got to modernize in stride.”
“We all recognize that they [the Russians] are more active than we feel comfortable. With a behavior set that makes us feel uncomfortable and a presence around our shores and a presence around our hardware and our warships that is distinctly too close.”

“I am very, very concerned that Russia is changing the security complex and context of the moment, but I think it is really important […] to understand that there is a panoramic arc of 360 degrees and there is no slave now to the idea of ’phased warfare’. This implies very importantly to the High North as much as anywhere else.”

“In the Artic […] the Russian Navy is extremely active and if we go into the High North we note the construction of Arctic bases, we note the deployment of more and more arctic exercises – not just in the Arctic summer but in the arctic winter as well.”
Panel One
Exploration and Shipping – Common Interest?

By virtue of its geographic position, the Arctic has several properties relevant to world politics and economics. Arctic waters link North America and Eurasia and, thus, were an important route during the Second World War, when American supplies sought to keep Britain and the Soviet Union in the fight. Strategically, the Arctic also played a crucial role in both U.S. and Soviet nuclear deterrence schemes resulting in nuclear submarines from both sides shadowing each other under the ice for the duration of the Cold War. These two examples serve to demonstrate that the Arctic region previously attracted interest primarily due to its strategic geographic location, not because the Arctic offered any other particular appeal or advantage. This, however, might be subject to change. Global warming has the effect that permanently ice-covered areas are becoming increasingly accessible to shipping and human activity. This trend is closely related to globalisation and its human dynamics. Due to the indispensability of shipping to world economy, a more navigable Arctic may experience an increase in traffic by linking the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Two routes in particular bear the potential to become important corridors: The Northwest Passage crossing the Canadian and U.S. arctic waters, and the Northeast Passage spanning the Russian northern shore, hence aptly referred to as the Northern Sea Route in Russia. Both of these routes considerably shorten the distance, the time of transit, and affect cargo rates between the Northern Atlantic and the Pacific. Thus, the Arctic may serve as a metaphorical bridge linking two very different political and economic spheres. In fact, the Asian-Pacific and North Atlantic regions differ significantly in terms of their political configuration. While in the latter region NATO serves virtually as...
a bracket that links the democracies of the U.S., Canada, Denmark, and Norway facing the more autocratic Russia in a complex and periodically adversarial relationship, there is no such institution in the Pacific area. Global warming potentially opens this inter-regional maritime communication link and it is also projected to increase the exploitability of mineral resources previous inaccessible due to harsh environmental conditions. To the global markets, the most interesting commodity the Arctic has to offer is natural gas. The dual enablers of globalisation and climate change may increase the quantity and quality of mineral exploitation in this region.

Shipping and Resource Exploitation – Commercial Perspective and Considerations

Until recently, there has been no significant increase of shipping in Arctic waters. This is largely due to the fact that the passages remain, for most of the year, blocked by ice and are simply not profitable for shipping companies, because of the high costs incurred by insurance premiums and crewing expenses. Accordingly, if at all, only the time-sensitive delivery of high-value cargo appears to be profitable for private companies at the moment. Another factor deterring shipping lines at the moment is the comparatively insufficient infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route. The lack of port facilities makes maintenance a challenge and

Panelists (from left to right):
RADM(DNK N), ret.
Torben Ørting Jørgensen
Philipp Hermes
Dr. Rasmus Bertelsen (Chair)

Rapporteur:
Niklas Masuhr
The spotty surveillance and SAR capabilities in place increase the risks associated with navigating in this extreme environment. These factors increase insurance premiums which lower/cut the profit margins of regular cargo. Additionally, the prestige allotted to companies being able to traverse Arctic waters is not an overriding factor when faced without perspectives on a sufficient degree of profitability. Accordingly, as of yet, most companies engaged in the Arctic are highly specialised ones dealing with the exploration and exploitation of natural resources or facilitating Arctic tourism. While transits may currently be unprofitable enterprises, presently oil and gas exploitation is the primary factor driving Arctic development. In addition, Western shipping companies are encumbered by the lack of a meaningful exchange of information between government and corporate levels.

Recent Trends and Dynamics

The commercial drive into the Arctic region has been stalled by the Western sanctions against Russia, implemented as a reaction to the annexation of Crimea. Western corporations’ ability to invest in Arctic development has since decreased. Another factor slowing down investments in the Arctic are low oil prices which make Arctic exploration and exploitation a risky and expensive endeavour due to diminished or no returns. Compensating for the lack of Western engagement, Russia is seeking investments and expertise from China in order to benefit from the region’s resources. Hence, Western sanctions may turn out to have the unintended consequence of shutting out Western corporations from the Arctic region to the benefit of the Chinese. While there is no identifiable timeline, it may be argued that Western governments and cor-
porations need to act quickly and find ways to become a significant stakeholder in the Arctic and, thus, prevent the establishment of Chinese economic dominance just off the Russian shores. Another complicating factor is the lack of unity and coordination among the Western powers, since interests are not even aligned within NATO as a whole. For example, the U.S. is considering the Northwest Passage as international waters, thereby challenging the Canadian claim that these waters are Canadian territorial waters. Accordingly, NATO may serve as a vehicle of communication and exchange between its Arctic members, yet not in order to create concerted action in the region. The European Union has also been reluctant to fulfil that role, which is not entirely surprising, since most of its members are non-Arctic states. Besides these dynamics emanating from the Arctic itself, its future trajectory is still largely contingent on a variety of external effects. These are primarily the variables of global warming and globalisation which have a decisive impact on the costs and potential profits of operating in the extreme conditions of the High North. It appears safe to assume that these two mechanisms define the extent to which human economic activity can and will expand into the Arctic region. However, besides these long-term effects, short-term developments and singular events in international relations may very well impact the Arctic in a significant way. If, for example, the Middle East region was to experience a further increase in violence, possibly even in terms of inter-state conflict, rising oil prices might make Arctic exploitation potentially necessary and certainly more profitable. In a similar vein, Arctic traffic might increase as a result of serious confrontations around other key choke-points. Due to the opportunistic nature of global shipping, the Arctic passages may gain in significance.
At first glance, the Arctic region may look like an area where cooperation prevails over competition. However, global trends and tensions have reached this remote maritime area and competing interests, mainly between the West, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), undeniably have a military side to them. Western proponents of naval power have noted with appreciation a perceived increase in maritime security awareness among NATO’s hierarchy. In recent years, operations designed to combat piracy, project power, and to deliver humanitarian aid have demonstrated the importance and versatility of naval assets. With recent international crises and developments, Europe has re-emerged as an area of contestation which reinvigorated collective defence within NATO and, thus has led to increased maritime/naval awareness. The most significant developments are Russia’s aggressive behaviour in Eastern Europe and the emergence of the so-called Islamic State as a result of regional instability and turmoil. Another result of the changing international political climate is the fact that Western governments have increased their naval spending and envisaged naval capability in a significant and sustained way for the first time since the end of the Cold War. However, while potential threats have shifted the focus back on Europe, the operational areas assigned to these significant flashpoints are the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea, respectively. NATO’s Northern flank, the Arctic, however, appears not to have been considered of critical im-
importance. This lack of Western attention is compounded, and probably part of its cause in the first place, by a series of problems and challenges associated with the Arctic maritime domain. The first complex concerns technological and environmental complications. The degree to which NATO’s naval forces are able to operate in Arctic climate is quite questionable, since most navies do not construct their vessels with the explicit ability to operate in these conditions. This does not only concern hulls able to withstand the ice, but also, for example, sensor arrays that are capable to operate not just in cold weather but in extreme harsh conditions. It is especially questionable whether the majority of NATO’s maritime forces are available to conduct operations at the high-end of the operational spectrum in the Arctic. These challenges are exacerbated simply by the tyranny of numbers. While NATO is increasing the flexibility and interoperability of its assets, each ship can only operate in one given theatre at a time, stretching Western naval forces thin. Especially the broad ranges of missions and environmental conditions that European navies are supposed to successfully operate in appear daunting. Many policymakers expect that European assets should have the ability to operate both in the Arctic and in much warmer waters like the Persian Gulf. The January 2016 revelations concerning the Royal Navy’s Type-45 destroyers having to be refitted to operate in warm Gulf waters showcases this problem. A last complicating factor for NATO, especially concerning the European members, is the fact that their superiority in technology and its applications has been diminished or even lost during the post-Cold War era. New doctrines and procedures are being developed elsewhere, with new excellence to be found in China.
(doctrines), Russia (electronic warfare), Iran (surface tactics) and countries such as Vietnam, South Korea and Japan (anti-submarine warfare).

**Chinese Presence in the Arctic - Part of a Global Strategy?**

The PRC has discovered the Arctic as an area of interest. Whereas an official Arctic strategy has not yet been released, the PRC does seem to have wide-ranging maritime interests in the region. Currently, China is operating one non-nuclear icebreaker, the Xuelong (“Snow Dragon”), with a second to be procured and based on a Finish design. Both ships are primarily used for research purposes with a special focus on climate change. However, the Antarctic appears to be the primary focus of China’s polar scientific endeavours. In comparison to five research stations in the Antarctic, China runs just one permanent research station in the Arctic. Further areas of interest in the Arctic concern foreign trade and maritime trade routes. These interests are connected to the strategic ‘Malacca Dilemma’, i.e., the PRC’s economic dependence on chokepoints like the Malacca Strait which connects East and South Asian trade routes. Depending on the trajectory of global warming and receding ice caps, the Northern Sea Routes may enable Beijing to reduce its dependence on the current sea lines of communications with their exposed chokepoints and, thus, decrease its trade routes’ vulnerability.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is undergoing a remarkable modernisation of its assets. Next to the PRC’s increasing dependence on maritime trade, this modernisation is fuelled by Chinese threat perceptions of being virtually surrounded on three sides by the United States and their allies in the Asia-Pacific Region. This encirclement is perceived to be ranging from Japan in the East to India in the South and South-West, forming a C-shape. The modernisation’s most visible success is the operation of the Liaoning, the first Chinese aircraft carrier using a hull acquired from Ukraine. However, the PLAN’s current main role appears to be the strengthening of the Asian-Pacific core, as opposed to ambitions of global power projection. So far, China rather appears to intend the employment of its aircraft carrier as an asset to coercive diplomacy towards its neighbours than as an asset for high-intensity warfare. Next to supporting regional dominance, the PLAN seems to acknowledge the importance of a forward defence strategy/capability since
the Western air campaign in Libya in 2011. The case of the Liaoning may be instructive in another way, since it was originally purchased by a Chinese company, ostensibly in order to build a floating casino establishment. Accordingly, Chinese commercial activity, such as the acquisition of port facilities in Greece and economic activity in the Arctic should also be considered from a security perspective.

Despite the success of developing the PLAN to a significant regional player, there seem to be inherent weaknesses in its current state. Most significantly, China still relies on Soviet/Russian technology in a number of key warship components, namely sensor and propulsion systems. Despite this apparent disadvantage, the result may be a closer cooperation between Russia and the PRC in naval affairs.

Russian Activities in the Arctic – Establishment of Sovereignty or Militarisation?

While both the West and the PRC appear to view the Arctic as a sideshow in their regional goals and aspirations, the Arctic region is of crucial importance for the Russian Federation. This is mostly owed to the mineral resources expected to be in reach and their indispensability for the long-term prospects of the Russian economy. As a result of current Western sanctions, Russia depends heavily on Chinese investment in the region's infrastructure and the exploitation of its coveted mineral wealth. While enhanced cooperation seems to mirror the Chinese dependence on top-tier naval technology, the relationship between the two countries vis-à-vis the Arctic is not as cooperative and shaped by interdependence as it might appear at first glance. While Moscow desperately needs Chinese investment along its Northern shoreline, the activities of Beijing's research and commercial assets are also a source of concern. This is caused mainly by the lack of surveillance capability. Russian leaders appear to view themselves vulnerable to commando raids or other covert operations emanating from ostensibly peaceful Chinese vessels in the area. If one accepts this notion, it follows that the Russian threat perception to-
wards the Arctic is mainly directed towards the PRC, not the West. Besides improvements in its surveillance network, Russia is enhancing other military capabilities in the region. These include the deployment of motorised rifle brigades in Northern Siberia, stationing of fighter/bomber aircraft in the area and the establishment of strategic quick reaction forces consisting of marine infantry and airborne units. Additional, sub-military (civilian defence, constabulary) measures taken by Moscow are efforts to fortify the region by the establishment of extremely durable permanent camps and Search-and-Rescue (SAR) centres along the shore. Whether one considers Russian activity primarily as an attempt to militarise the Arctic for a regional advantage or one concurs with the more modest notion of defending Russian territorial sovereignty via military presence, the fact remains that Russia is increasing its Arctic military capability and presence. This drive includes testing much of its new equipment in the Arctic to guarantee its operability in the region and the development of new specialised equipment such as heavy transport vehicles. An important strategic tool in Russia’s arsenal is the navy, specifically the Northern Fleet headquartered in Severomorsk. The country’s leadership considers this fleet the most relevant naval element at its disposal since Russia’s nuclear missile-equipped submarines are embedded in this fleet. In any case, the Russian Navy is considered a key element of a reinvigorated global stance of the country and has been modernised accordingly. However, at this point it is questionable, whether this drive has sufficient depth and breadth in order to sustainably increase the Russian Navy’s significance.
The receding polar ice cap and the entailed increase in human activity in the Arctic are expected to be the source of a much higher degree of ‘soft’ maritime security challenges than before. These challenges include non-military threats to regional stability and prosperity, foremost among them environmental risks and safety concerns over activity such as resource exploration, fishing, and commercial shipping. At this point, the Arctic can be considered a very stable geographical area in which the rule of law is the defining mechanism of order. This is especially striking when compared to other areas in which Russian and Western interests meet, such as the Baltic and Black Seas, and where such mechanisms are, at times, over-ridden. However, the Arctic system is characterised by a patchwork of international organisations and regimes, bi- as well as multilateral agreements, and various legal issues. The key governmental players are the so-called Arctic Five, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark, and Russia which bring particular and occasionally dissenting interests to the table. Due to the country’s geographical position and the Arctic’s importance for its economy, Russia strongly maintains that its interests are to be treated as significant and reasonable. However, its significant military build-up is not mirrored by any of its neighbours, and its assertiveness elsewhere has raised concerns about the ostensible stability of the Arctic region. Of particular concern are frequent Russian snap exercises which make it hard for its neighbours to
confidently discern whether the preparations in question only serve as exercises or support more malignant objectives. Since the Arctic is, after all, a maritime zone, developments here may have repercussions on maritime affairs globally. Especially for Europe, the trend of neglecting maritime security challenges is simply no option due to modern society’s dependence on seaborne trade and the importance of a stable political global framework.

**Ensuring Freedom of Navigation – practical and legal challenges**

Even though the Arctic is considered as a region with a high degree of international cooperation and regulation, it may not serve as a blueprint for other regions in questions of maritime security. While the Arctic council offers a forum for the Arctic nations, it is not designed as a forum for substantial discussions of security matters.

The fundamental legal basis of maritime security is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and respective customary international law. One of the treaty’s core regulations is the Freedom of the High Seas, which guarantees freedom of navigation including the peaceful passage of ships on the high seas and in international straits. In fact, UNCLOS is the most significant legal document on High North issues, since the Arctic is covered by water, albeit in the form of ice, making it subject of the Convention and its provisions. UNCLOS also contains regulations on what is considered Territorial Waters. Currently, Russia is challenging the status-quo enshrined in UNCLOS in two ways. Firstly, Russia attempts to extend its territorial waters in the Arctic and, secondly, seeks to exert a higher degree of state control over areas it

Conceptualizing maritime security is much more complex than in the past.
assumes to be Russian. The Russian Federation justifies its current drive to expand its territory with the extended continental shelf considered to be part of the country’s landmass. In fact, over 100 countries are presently employing a similar line of argumentation in order to expand their territorial waters by interpreting UNCLOS in their favour. However, current Russian behaviour may suggest it will not accept any foreign ruling on its extended continental shelf. Domestic politics and the inward projection of a powerful world power may be a driving factor, since the planting of a Russian flag at the North Pole’s seabed appears to have been primarily aimed at the domestic audience. The expectation that Russia may not adhere to the provisions of UNCLOS are fuelled by the demand of prior notification from Chinese ice breaker voyages in what is assumed to be own territorial waters. While the Russian delineation of its territorial waters is based on the argument of the extended continental shelf, there is also no legal basis for the prohibition of innocent passage of civilian vessels. Due to the fundamental relevance of Freedom of Navigation for the global economy, efforts to safeguard this principle should not be neglected in order to prevent the establishments of precedents. The United States is particularly involved in Freedom of Navigation operations, most prominently in the Asia-Pacific region. It should be noted that tools to uphold free navigation and unlimited overflight are not exclusively located within the military realm, but range from employing diplomatic means to naval assets. However, the West should be careful to avoid applying double standards in dealing with the issues of territorial waters and, thus, providing other states with precedents on limiting them. Notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, the West should confidently andconcertedly assert the freedoms embedded in UNCLOS towards Russia, which is one of the signatory states. While considerations of national interests, culture and perceptions may be relevant to policymakers, they are immaterial in the realm of international law.

Local Rivalries in Times of Global Competition – Avenues of Cooperation between Russia and the West

Western countries and Russia have acknowledged the existence and parallel nature of hard and soft security challenges in the Arctic re-
region. Consequently, they have implemented them in their respective Arctic strategies and doctrines. With the expected increase in economic activity in the Arctic region, there is a greater necessity to cooperate on questions of environmental security, Search-and-Rescue infrastructure, and legal agreements or frameworks which provide a sufficient measure of order. On the other hand, the current geopolitical climate with Russian actions elsewhere points towards more confrontational relations in terms of hard security issues. Whereas the increase in Russian regional interests and Arctic capabilities themselves are not a source of significant concern to the West, it is nevertheless coupled with a severe lack of trust after actions in Georgia and the Ukraine, the lack of transparency, and anti-Western rhetoric. The case of Russo-Norwegian relations is instructive in how these two seemingly contradictory trends may be reconciled and even support a stabilisation of relations. The bilateral relations between the two countries can be described as asymmetrical but largely pragmatic. For example, in 2010 a maritime delimitation treaty solved a 40-year disagreement in the Barents Sea. However, relations partly broke down in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea. Norway, along with all of NATO, suspended military-to-military cooperation with Russia. Notwithstanding, Norway, Sweden and Finland did not suspend people-to-people cooperation in the area, and Norway in particular upheld several non-military forms of cooperation. These include coast guard and SAR cooperation and the Incidents at Sea Treaty (INCSEA). This treaty commits both countries’ navies to a set of established procedures. The potentially most significant cooperative project may be the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, created in 2015, which may offer a platform for communication on non-military issues. Collaborating via coast guards may also to as a confidence-building measure and, thus, lower the escalatory potential of diverging interests in the region. The forum may be the first institution to provide this exchange not just in matters of safety but also security. These measures may build trust and confidence between Russia and the West and lead to the establishment of similar arrangements that increase transparency, possibly even in the military domain. However, while the Arctic may serve as a lever in opening new channels of cooperation and lowering tensions, current Russian behaviour causes scepticism as to its willingness to follow agreed-upon rules.
“We do have fora in place, we do have bilateral arrangements in place, we have legal norms in place, but we lack actually a place where you can sit down and talk security/ maritime security matters. So that’s for me a void.”

“It’s a done deal. We have no say in the North. Do we accept that Russia runs it now? Do we accept it in twenty years’ time? We can be as vigilant as we want but I am not sure there is that much that we have options and capabilities to deliver against.”

“You have a completely different dynamic to what you are seeing in the West and the contrast is just incredibly stark. And it seems that [...] NATO – the Western orthodoxy – is still plain with anxiety that maritime security still exists, it’s nice and soft and ‘shake-hands’ and it is cooperation and it’s lovely. And Russia is just militarized. The whole regime. That’s it. It’s done. The deal is done”
“We do have arrangements in place that we have signed with the Russians some time ago, but I think it is important to not only recollect them but also actually remind our Russian counterparts as well as our own colleagues [...] that we will need to live up with them.”

“Russia has after all what we have seen about its military outreach and its upgrading of its capabilities, a legitimate interest in this region. Yet it sends very ambivalent messages and sometimes behaves different than it actually speaks. [...] We want a Russia that adheres to legal principles, we what a Russia that adheres and plays fully along the lines of cooperation.”

“We should be aware of, that the sources of international tensions on the strategic level have to do with the internal problems of these [Russian and Chinese] systems. We have to take the fact that there are new strategic frontlines, that we have strategic competitors or adversaries and that we have to study them very closely in order to see the reasons for them to behave against their enlightened interest, as we would call it.”
“This conference, while only two years old, has found its way into the heart of the Maritime Enterprises’s calendar offering an interesting and pithy views of issues that really bother the maritime community. […] The vibrancy both of discussion and questioning is rare for normally placid maritime conferences.”
– VADM (GBR N) Clive Johnstone CB CBE, Commander Allied Maritime Command, Northwood (U.K.)

“All the topic and panels have been very interesting, a lot of food for thought. […] I am happy to have been a part here.”
– CAPT (EST N) Sten Sepper, Chief of Estonian Navy, Tallinn

“My first visit to Kiel and to the conference and I emerged a lot more interested in the breadth of issues discussed and the range of opinions (Artic, Russia, energy, maritime security, etc.). I very much want to return and re-engage with the naval professionals and industry experts that filled the informative panels and the illuminating side discussions with the heads of several regional Navies.”
– Dr. Frank Hoffman, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University Washington, D.C.
“The Kiel Conference is the largest conference in Germany bringing together many international experts on maritime issues and the regional context […] is a very worthwhile endeavour.”
– Sebastian Feyock, Program Officer, USA/Transatlantic Relations Program, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin

“The Kiel Conference 2016 was an enriching and educational experience. As a young professional in maritime security, this conference offered in depth discussions on issues I follow as well as individual access to high level officials from NATO governments, academia, and the maritime industry.”

“Arctic security is interconnected with maritime security in other regions of the world. […] The Kiel Conference has excellent panelists and an excellent setting to it. You get good briefings and good interaction with the audiences as well. […] The networking opportunities are really great.”
– LTCDR (SWE N) Stefan Lundqvist, Swedish Defence College, Stockholm
Bios
of Speakers and Chairpersons
(in alphabetical order)

Dr. Kristian Åtland
Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Kjeller, Norway
Dr. Kristian Åtland is a Senior Research Fellow with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), located at Kjeller, Norway. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Tromsø and an MA degree in Russian studies from the University of Oslo. In the period from 1994 to 2002, he was employed in the Norwegian Foreign Service and worked as a desk officer in the Foreign Ministry’s Russia and CIS division, as Second Secretary at the Norwegian Embassy in Kiev, and as Consul at the Norwegian Consulate General in San Francisco. In 2007–2008, he was a Fulbright visiting scholar at the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ISEEES), University of California, Berkeley. Since 2002, he has worked as a defence researcher and published a number of articles and research reports on various Russia-related topics, with a particular focus on security issues and crisis management in the European Arctic. His most recent publication is “North European Security after the Ukraine conflict”, published in Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2016).

Dr. Stefanie Babst
Head of Strategic Analysis Capability, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Brussels
Dr. Stefanie Babst has been a member of NATO’s International Staff since 1998. She is currently the Head of the Strategic Analysis Capability for the NATO Secretary General and for the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. In this capacity, she is responsible for preparing comprehensive assessments on potential upcoming crisis situations in geographical and functional areas of relevance and concern to NATO, as well as on their implications for the Alliance. Prior to joining SAC in 2012, she occupied various posts in NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division. She began her career in 1991 as Assistant Professor for International Security Policy at the Institute
of Political Science/ Christian-Albrechts-University in Kiel, Germany, moving on to become Professor of Russian and East European Studies at the Federal Armed Forces Command & General Staff College in Hamburg.

Dr. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen
Barents Chair in Politics, University of Tromsø-The Arctic University of Norway

Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen is a Dane and grew up in Iceland, so he has a deep professional and personal commitment to the North Atlantic and the Arctic. He is Professor of Northern Studies and holds the Barents Chair in Politics at the University of Tromsø-the Arctic University of Norway. Rasmus believes in the Icelandic tradition of "að sigla" – "to sail" – to travel for education and experience, also expressed by the Chinese saying of "better to travel 10,000 miles than to read 10,000 books". He studied or worked at the Universities of Copenhagen, Iceland, Lausanne, Geneva, Amsterdam, Cambridge, Sciences Po, Harvard, Tokyo Institute of Technology, United Nations University and Aalborg. His research addresses historical and current transnational knowledge relations: soft power of American and European universities in the Middle East and East Asia, universities channeling information, ideas, talent and resources between societies, transnational triple helix innovation, and the role of science diplomacy under power transition. As Barents Chair in Politics, Rasmus focuses on the Arctic after the end of the Cold War/bipolarity and in light of the globalisation/power transition/return of China. Science allows China to enter the Arctic in a less threatening way and for the Arctic powers to integrate China with greater confidence. Arctic science also keeps Arctic cooperation together when threatened by Russian-Western geopolitical competition in Ukraine. Rasmus also studies the international political economy of the interplay between human capital and natural resources in Arctic societies. Strong local formal human capital, often including brain circulation, is a necessary condition for comprehensive sustainable development. With colleagues, Rasmus has shown the importance of strong local human capital with transnational skills for Iceland and Faroe in order to benefit from marine resources, hydro and geothermal energy, and offshore oil and gas potentials.
Dr. Sebastian Bruns
Head of Center for Maritime Strategy & Security
at the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK)


Prof. Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg
Professor at the European University Viadrina Frankfurt/Oder

Professor Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg holds the Chair of Public Law, especially Public International law, European Law and Foreign Constitutional Law at the Europa-Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. In the academic years 2003/2004 and 2012/2013 he was the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College. From October 2004 until October 2008, he was the Dean of the Law Faculty of the Europa-Universität. From October 2008 until November 2012, he was the Vice-President of that university. Previously, he served as Professor of Public Interna-
tional Law at the University of Augsburg. He has been a Visiting Professor at the Universities of Kaliningrad (Russia), Almaty (Kazakhstan), Santiago de Cuba (Cuba) and Nice (France). He was the rapporteur of the International Law Association Committee on Maritime Neutrality and was the Vice-President of the German Society of Military Law and the Law of War. Since 2007, he has been a member of the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy. Since May 2012 he is the Vice-President of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War and since May 2013 he is a Senior Fellow of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg was among a group of international lawyers and naval experts who produced the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. In 2002, he published the German Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg has been a member of several groups of experts working on the current state and progressive development of international humanitarian law, including the Manual on Air and Missile Warfare (2010) and the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013). He is a widely published author of articles and books on public international law, in particular international humanitarian law, European and German constitutional law.

Philipp Hermes

Attorney-at-law, International Law Offices BHM Penlaw, Hamburg

Philipp Hermes is founding and managing partner of BHM Penlaw, a group of international lawyers specialised in maritime and marine affairs with offices in Hamburg, Berlin, Paris and Edinburgh. He has expertise in international maritime and marine finance, maritime insurances and ship construction matters. Since Philipp Hermes is interested in the global and regional correlation between the different maritime and marine stakeholders, one focus of his advising portfolio is Maritime Security which is relevant for all stakeholders in maritime and marine affairs. Philipp Hermes is advising the public sector and private maritime industries, e.g. banks, insurance companies, shipping companies, ship construction companies in Europe and elsewhere. Philipp Hermes is naval officer (reserve) and regularly contributes columns to World Economy.
Vice Admiral (RN) Clive C C Johnstone

CB CBE, Commander NATO Allied Maritime Command, London

Clive Johnstone is the Commander of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command. He is NATO’s principal maritime adviser and has operational Command of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces. A graduate of Shrewsbury School, Durham University and Britannia Royal Naval College, Vice Admiral Johnstone has deployed to most points of the compass with the Royal Navy and has served as Navigator, Fighter Controller and Principal Warfare Officer in ships ranging from Minesweepers to Aircraft Carriers. He has been engaged in operations in the North Atlantic, Caribbean, the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. He also served in HM Yacht BRITANNIA during an appointment that culminated in the handover of Hong Kong.

At sea he has commanded HMS IRON DUKE (a Type 23 Frigate) and HMS BULWARK (an amphibious assault ship and the Royal Navy’s Amphibious Flagship), undertaking operations in the Northern Gulf, the Horn of Africa and off Lebanon. He was awarded a CBE for an extended Gulf Deployment and the evacuation of British Nationals out of Beirut. Ashore, he has worked in procurement, resources and operational planning. In more senior positions he has had roles in personnel strategy and leadership of the Naval Staff (in London). In 2008, he was selected as Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup and subsequently General Sir David Richards. Promoted Rear Admiral in July 2011, Clive Johnstone served as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Training) and Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) until April 2013. He became Assistant Chief of Naval Staff in May 2013 prior to assuming Command of NATO Allied Maritime Command in October 2015. A defining theme in Flag rank has been the projection of a considered maritime voice in the National and NATO defence and security debate, linking across boundaries with partners of all forms, friends and allies.
Rear Admiral (rtd.) Torben Ørting Jørgensen  
Senior Director and Head of Global Specialised Tonnage, Maersk Broker K/S, Copenhagen

Torben Ørting Jørgensen was born in 1959 in Frøslev just north of the Danish border to Germany. He signed up for the Naval Academy and was commissioned as First Lieutenant in 1983. From 1983 to 1992 he served in the Ocean Patrol Vessel Squadron; as commanding officer of the Training Yacht THYRA; as commanding officer of the ocean patrol cutter AGDEK; as Frigates, Operations Officer; and as STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC Staff Operations Officer. He completed several operational deployments during this period, amongst other 4 years service in Greenlandic waters. He has taken additional staff training in UK, Canada and in Germany as a proud member of ASTO. 33 (Verwendungslehrgang Generalstab-/Admiralsstabsdienst (Marine), Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg). Promotion to Commander came in 1993. From 1993 to 1997, he was staff Officer for the Ministry of Defence. In 1997, he returned as Executive Officer and the becoming Commanding Officer of frigate PETER TORDENSKIOLD until end 2001. His promotion to Commander Senior Grade came in 2001 and from 2001-2004 he served as Branch Head, Plans and Policy in Chief of Defence Staff. He was promoted to Captain in 2004 and served as Head of Division Plans and Policy. Promoted to Commodore in 2006, he served as Deputy Commander of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq and in August he became the Director of Management at Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. In July 2007, he was promoted to Rear Admiral and took the helm as Assistant Chief of Staff Capabilities at Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation in August 2007. Following internal disagreement on reorganisation of SACT Staff, he was relieved from NATO service and returned to Denmark in 2009. From 2009, he has worked for the A.P. Moeller-Maersk family-owned Maersk Broker and presently heads the Global Specialised Tonnage Team and, among other things, is responsible for projects in the Arctic.
Dr. Sarah Kirchberger
Author of "Assessing China's Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications", University of Hamburg

Sarah K. Kirchberger is a China specialist with work experience in academia and industry. Her areas of expertise include China's political system, modern Chinese history and China's military modernization. In 1999, Kirchberger graduated with an M.A. degree in Sinology, Political Science and Archaeology from the University of Hamburg after having studied Chinese language at Taipei during 1997/98. Following postgraduate studies in Political Science at Trier University, she completed a PhD degree in Sinology in 2004. From 1994 until 2003, she was a scholar of the German National Academic Foundation. From 2007 until 2010, Kirchberger served as a naval analyst with shipbuilder Blohm + Voss, Hamburg, where she was charged with observing naval developments around the world, working in close cooperation with technical and military experts. After becoming an assistant professor of Sinology at the Asia-Africa-Institute (AAI) at the University of Hamburg in 2010, Kirchberger began focusing on China's naval development, and in 2015 published her book "Assessing China's Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications" (Springer, Berlin & Heidelberg). This study analyses China's quest for naval power from a wide variety of analytic angles, and includes an in-depth analysis of China's current naval capability profile. Originally a specialist in Chinese domestic politics and comparative government, her first monograph was an analysis of informal rules in Chinese and Taiwanese politics (in German, 2004). Furthermore she has published various book chapters and articles on topics including Chinas political system, CCP party history, Chinese domestic politics, Chinese foreign policy, and naval moderniation.
Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause
Conference Co-Chairman KC16 and Director, Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK)
Joachim Krause is Director of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and Chairman of the Foundation for Science and Democracy. Until the autumn of this year, he is also a full-time professor for International Relations at the Kiel University, a position he has held since 2001. Other positions of note include Chairman of the German Council on Foreign Relations’ scientific council, and executive board member at Aspen Institute Germany. Prof. Krause previously held positions at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the Bologna Center of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He is one of the editors of the “Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security” (London 2016). His research interests include international security, nuclear proliferation, maritime security, the study of terrorism and radicalisation, the rise of great powers, and German foreign and security policy. With numerous books and articles to his name, he is one of Germany’s most prolific political scientists and is frequently asked to contribute to national and international media outlets.

Peter Roberts
Senior Fellow for Sea Power and Maritime Security, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London
Peter Roberts is Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He runs two research programmes at the Institute, in Sea Power/Maritime studies and in C4ISTAR. Peter researches a range of subjects within these themes from strategy and philosophy, Sea Power, Command and Control, Maritime Studies and Naval Weapons Systems, C4ISR, Military Education and Military use of Cyber Warfare. He also oversees conferences, meetings and lectures globally in these areas. Peter’s recent publications include, “The Future of Amphibious Warfare”, RUSI Journal (160:2) 2015, The Validity of deterrence in the twenty first century, RUSI Occasional Paper July 2015, Ballistic Missile Defence: Drivers and Options, RUSI Occasional Paper August 2015, “Maritime Security in Asia and Europe” in Partners for Global Security: New direction for the UK-Japan defence and security relationship, (ed. Eyl,
Tsuruoka and Schwarck) RUSI-NIDS Whitehall Paper (3–15), as well as numerous OpEds and articles in the professional media. His upcoming publications include, ISR in 2035 and beyond (RUSI, 2015) and Sovereignty: updating the concept for defence and security (Taylor and Francis, 2015). He is a commentator for several international news outlets and has provided evidence for various parliamentary bodies both nationally and across organisations. Peter retired from the Royal Navy in January 2014 after a career as a Warfare Officer, serving both as a Commanding Officer and National Military Representative in a variety of roles with all three branches of the British Armed forces, the US Coast Guard, US Navy, US Marine Corps and intelligence services from a variety of other nations. He has served as chairman for several NATO working groups and 5 Eyes Maritime tactics symposia. He has a Masters degree from King’s College London in Defence Studies and is a Visiting Lecturer in Strategy at the Portsmouth Business School at the University of Portsmouth, as well as being Fellow of the Chartered Management Institute.

Bruce Stubbs
Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy Division OPNAV N51B at Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.

From June 2008 to May 2011, Mr. Stubbs was responsible for the coordination and implementation of Maritime Domain Awareness programmes, policies, and related issues across the Defense Department. In addition from January to May 2009, Mr. Stubbs served as the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Acting). In this position, he advised the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of the Navy on national security, foreign policy and intelligence issues. Prior to joining the Department of the Navy, Mr. Stubbs served as the Maritime Security Advisor to the Special Envoy for Middle East Regional Security, General James Jones USMC, Ret., and was a member of the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Board to advise the Secretary on naval and maritime matters. Mr. Stubbs began his career as an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard. He served on the staff of the National Security Council, military aide to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commanding Officer of USCGC HARRIET LANE, and Commandant of Cadet at the Coast Guard Academy. He was also assigned as the Assistant Commandant for Capability with responsibility for the Coast Guard’s 275-ships, 2,000-boats, 220-aircraft, and
188-multi-mission coastal stations, as well as the Coast Guard’s intelligence programme, and the 35,000-members in the volunteer Auxiliary. As a Coast Guardsman, Mr. Stubbs also served in the U.S. Navy as a division officer in USS BADGER during a combat tour in Vietnam, and as an instructor at the Naval War College. He qualified for a Surface Warfare Officer Pin and is a graduate of Tactical Action Officer School. Mr. Stubbs received a bachelor’s of science from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, a master’s in business administration from the University of Washington, and a master’s of arts with distinction from the Naval War College.

Dr. Igor Sutyagin
Senior Research Fellow in Russian Studies,
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London

Dr. Igor Sutyagin's is RUSI's Senior Research Fellow in Russian Studies. His research is concerned with US-Russian relations, strategic armaments developments and broader nuclear arms control, anti-ballistic missile defence systems. Prior to joining RUSI, Dr Sutyagin completed his PhD in History of Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Moscow Institute for the USA and Canada Studies (Russian Academy of Science), which was supervised by Professor Andrey Kokoshin. His thesis explored the US Navy’s role in carrying out the US foreign policy tasks throughout the 1970s and 1980s. He has written extensively on nuclear and conventional arms control, including naval arms control, safety and security of nuclear weapons, modernization and development of modern armaments as well as issues associated with ABM systems and their stabilising influence upon the US-Russian relationship. He has authored over 100 articles and booklets published in the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland. He is also the co-author of the book "Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons". Igor worked at the Institute of US and Canadian Studies for twelve years at the Political-Military Studies Department, where he held the position of the head of section for US military-technical and military-economy policy. Igor also has a Masters Degree in Radio-physics and Electronics from the Physics Department, Moscow State University (1988).
Dr. Lee Willet
'Head of Naval Desk and Editor Jane's Navy International at IHS Jane's,
London
Dr. Lee Willet is the editor of IHS Jane's Navy International and head of IHS
Jane's Naval Desk. He has over 25 years of experience in delivering inde-
pendent insight and analysis on a range of naval and wider defence and
security matters. In his first year in post, he led the successful delivery of
online and print content of a principal global naval publication, increasing
the level of international coverage. Additionally, he deepened his expertise
by becoming IHS's senior analyst on naval developments in the Asia-Pacific
region. Dr. Willet has published a number of major feature articles in IHS
Jane's defence titles and presented at a variety of international conferences,
including at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. In his previ-
ous position as a senior research fellow at an independent think-tank, he led
the development of a programme in maritime studies and published hun-
dreds of pieces of written work, which range from monographs and book
chapters to editorial comments in daily media. He convened a broad range
of high-level discussion meetings involving senior international defence
and security leaders from across the military, political and industrial fields
and spoke at dozens of major international events. Dr. Willet's degrees in-
clude a Bachelor of Arts (Hons.) in Modern European Studies, International
Relations with French, a Master of Arts in War Studies and a doctorate in War
Studies, specialization in US/Soviet nuclear arms control.
Stay in Touch
Twitter: @kielconference
#kielconference
URL: www.kielconference.com
E-Mail: contact@kielconference.com

Disclaimer
The thoughts and opinions expressed in the report are those of the individual contributors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of NATO, the ISPK, or the COE CSW.
About
Kiel Conference is created by:

Executive Committee
Stefan Hansen,
Chief Executive Officer,
Institute for Security Policy
Kiel University (ISPK)

CAPT (DEU N) Johannes Schmidt-Thomée,
Executive Director, Centre of Excellence for
Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters
(COE CSW)

Organizers
Adrian J. Neumann, MSc. (ISPK)
Dr. Sebastian Bruns (ISPK)

CAPT (DEU N) Alexander Wald (COE CSW)
CDR jg. (DEU N) Dietmar Kober (COE CSW)